The challenge of climate change underscores a fundamental equity concern, which was a key stumbling block to reach a global agreement to phase out coal during the 26th Conference of the Parties in Glasgow in 2021. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached at that time, largely because several major emerging market economies, heavily reliant on coal for energy production, did not sign on, arguing that developed countries should shoulder the costs of their transition. In 2009, developed countries pledged to collectively mobilize $100 billion annually to assist developing and emerging nations in their transition efforts. Regrettably, they have struggled to fulfill this commitment.
Why do governments seem to neglect the urgency of transferring resources where they can achieve the greatest emissions reduction?
A crucial factor lies in the inherently political nature of environmental policies. These policies are often perceived as liabilities or assets, depending on the political party, and as such sensitive to electoral cycles. For instance, the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement in 2016 caused delays in the implementation of measures initiated by the previous administration. Given that electoral cycles are much shorter than the long-term agreements needed to combat climate change, governments often lack the commitment necessary to implement effective climate policies, leading to a global coordination failure.
When political frictions limit the use of environmental regulatory tools, financial markets may offer a decentralized incentive to enable the global transition.
If investors are motivated by the desire to mitigate the social harm associated with their own actions, they may willingly subsidize decarbonization if given the option. Financial securities tied to carbon emission reduction, such as Sustainability-Linked Bonds (SLBs) and Loans (SLLs), can bypass political constraints and facilitate cross-country transfers to regions with greater decarbonization potential. A recent paper by Allen, Barbalau, and Zeni (2023) formalizes this concept, demonstrating that carbon-contingent securities can serve as an alternative to regulation, free from political constraints, and can even replace regulation if substantial funds are channeled through these markets.
Whereas the results outlined in Allen, Barbalau, and Zeni (2023) are theoretical, it is worth noting that real-world versions of carbon-contingent securities, such as SLBs and SLLs, have already emerged in sustainable debt markets. These financial instruments tie interest rates to an issuer’s sustainable performance against carbon emissions reduction targets. Importantly, these instruments have mobilized around $1.6 trillion in capital as of 2022, dwarfing the $100 billion pledge to developing countries. Furthermore, this form of carbon-contingent financing has gained traction in countries where support for regulatory measures has been lacking (see Figure 2). By combining the global nature of capital markets with the incentives of carbon pricing, these securities have the potential to play a pivotal role in reducing carbon emissions.
Figure 2a: Stringency of the current environmental regulation measured by the direct or implied price of carbon in $/CO2 tones equivalent.